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Abstract
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Indonesia’s oil revenues and fuel subsidies dominate the 
nation’s economic policy agenda. This paper estimates 
the impact of higher international oil prices on the 
Indonesian government’s fiscal position in 2008 and 
beyond. It analyzes the interactions between government 
revenues and expenditures, as well as international oil 
prices, energy subsidies, and inter-governmental transfers. 
Looking at the impact of oil prices over US$100 per 
barrel, the paper presents five main findings. First, 
despite record high oil prices, the government’s oil and 
gas revenues have been decreasing relative to non-oil 
and gas revenues since 2001. Second, fuel subsides will 
reach record levels in 2008 while electricity subsidies have 
This paper is a product of the Pacific Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at wfengler@worldbank.org and tbulman@worldbank.org. 
been increasing even faster. Third, the paper finds that 
most of the fuel subsidy that directly benefits households 
goes to the richest 20 percent. Fourth, even at levels 
above US$100 per barrel, the government receives more 
revenues from oil and gas than it spends on energy 
subsidies. However, due to significant revenue-sharing 
with sub-national governments, high oil prices are net-
negative for the central government, while they create 
fiscal windfalls for many regions. Finally, the oil sector’s 
positive impact on Indonesia’s public finances declines as 
oil prices rise, because subsidies and other expenditures 
outgrow oil and gas revenues. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International crude oil prices have risen fourfold over the past five years. This has significantly impacted 
the fiscal position of many developing economies. Net energy-exporting economies have enjoyed 
significant growth in government revenues and hence fiscal space, as their governments’ tax and non-tax 
incomes from energy production have expanded or government-owned energy producers have paid higher 
dividends. The challenge for these economies is to ensure that these funds are spent in ways that benefit 
public welfare. Meanwhile, other economies are suffering fiscal pressures due to rapidly expanding state-
sponsored subsidies of energy products. Here, the challenge is to minimize macroeconomic instability 
arising from the growing drain on fiscal resources and the decline in purchasing power resulting from 
more costly oil, while mitigating the general instability emanating from volatile oil prices. A third group 
of economies allows world prices to fully pass into retail fuel prices, meaning rising oil prices are creating 
significant inflationary pressures domestically. 
Indonesia’s recent experience throws light on both the positive and negative impacts of higher oil prices 
on developing countries’ budgets. In 2008 oil and gas will be a significant source of net income for the 
Indonesian public sector, although the central government’s obligation to share oil and gas revenue with 
sub-national governments will see it run its largest ever oil and gas net deficit. On the revenue side, oil 
and gas revenues continue to provide a significant share of Indonesia’s government revenue. Indonesia 
pioneered the use of production sharing oil and gas exploitation contracts, making non-tax oil and gas 
revenues especially important. Indonesia’s oil production peaked over a decade ago, with inadequate 
investment in exploration reducing the number of new fields to replace the declining output from mature 
fields. The most recent indicators suggest production has troughed, and the sharp increases in oil prices 
over 2007 and the first half of 2008 are now lifting revenues from oil production. Section 2 details these 
trends. 
Indonesia subsidizes the retail price of many fuels and electricity. These subsidies have hefty impacts on 
the government’s budget, and on the surrounding political debates. Suharto’s New Order regime inherited 
fuel subsidies in 1967, at first maintaining the subsidized prices in order to avoid social instability in the 
early years, then allowing them to expand significantly as government revenues surged on the back of 
global oil prices in the early 1970s. Subsequently, the subsidy regime waxed and waned with movements 
in international prices and Indonesia’s fiscal space. This decade the government has experimented with a 
number of different subsidy regimes, including fixed local retail prices, linking retail prices to movements 
in world prices, and adjusting the mix of products subsidized. Recent increases in world crude oil prices 
have outpaced the government’s attempts to bring local energy prices closer to market rates, with energy 
subsidies now comprising a very large proportion of expenditure. The central government now spends far 
more on maintaining constant prices on various energy products than it does on capital investment, or 
than it does on education, healthcare and law and order combined. This remains true even after the 28.7 
percent average increase in subsidized fuel prices in May 2008. Section 3 discusses Indonesia’s fuel 
subsidies in detail. 
Finally, rising oil prices also eat away at the central government’s budget through the sharing of central 
government revenues with regional governments. These transfers expanded significantly with Indonesia’s 
‘big bang’ decentralization of 2001. A combination of realized and projected natural resource revenues 
are shared directly and indirectly by the central government across sub-national governments and 
specifically with producing regions, and additional funds are transferred to the special autonomous 
provinces of Aceh and Papua. This appears as an expenditure item in the central government’s budget, 
increasing its financing needs. However, since these transfers flow into sub-national governments’ 
budgets they have no significant net effect on the consolidated fiscal position. These transfers also create 
an incentive for the central government to make unrealistically low projections of oil prices — and hence 
likely revenues, as section 4 explains. 
  2Historically, oil and gas revenues have exceeded fuel subsidy expenditures and regional transfers, the 
exception being those years with large increases in international oil prices. Table 1 summarizes how these 
factors have come together over the past decade. It illustrates first the magnitude of oil and gas revenues, 
and then how these resources flow out of the central government’s budget: first, in the form of retail fuel 
and electricity price subsidies; second, through the fraction of oil and gas revenues that are transferred to 
sub-national governments as shared revenues, with additional shares of oil & gas revenue flowing to some 
producing regions; and third, 26 percent of oil and gas revenues projected for each year (net of projected 
revenue sharing) are transferred to sub-national governments as a ‘general allocation fund’ (DAU) with 
some additional funds transferred to oil & gas- producing regions. The first two types of transfer operate 
ex post, with the expenditures reflecting the actual costs of the subsidies and the actual oil & gas receipts, 
respectively. The third type of transfer, the DAU, is determined ex ante. It depends on the oil & gas 
revenues projected when parliament passes the initial budget for the coming fiscal year. It does not adjust 
to reflect realized revenues.  
Table 1.  Central government oil and gas revenue and expenditure cash flows  
US$ billion 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Oil and gas revenues 10.3 10.2 8.6 9.4 12.2 14.3 22.0 18.5 26.0
less:
Fuel subsidies 6.5 6.7 3.5 3.5 7.8 9.9 7.0 9.2 13.9
Electricity subsidy 0.3 0.4 3.3 3.6 6.6
National balance 3.8 3.5 5.1 5.9 4.2 4.0 11.7 5.7 5.4
less:
DAU (26% of APBN projected net 
oil & gas revenue)
0.6 0.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.5 4.4 4.4
Oil and gas revenue sharing 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.8 3.1 2.6 3.6
Central government balance 1.1 0.2 2.1 2.3 1.4 -0.2 4.1 -1.3 -1.9
Memo items:
IDR crude oil price 29 25 22 29 34 52 64 70 95
Oil lifting (thousand bpd) 1,405 1,273 1,320 1,092 1,072 999 1,000 899 927
* 2008 revised budget (APBN-P), except for the DAU allocation, which is based on the initial budget (APBN) for all years.
Source: World Bank calculations using Ministry of Finance data.  
 
In 2007, oil production fell short of even the relatively low, initial targets. However, international oil 
prices were significantly above expectations and more than offset this shortfall by supporting oil and gas-
related tax revenues. Tax revenues, which reflect profitability after production sharing, were slightly 
higher than the government had projected. This was more than offset by the shortfall in non-tax revenues, 
which largely reflect the government’s production-sharing receipts. This shortfall was driven by 
movements in recoverable production costs and the distribution of production across different oil & gas 
fields with their differing production contracts. Lower non-tax revenues meant less revenue to transfer 
from the central government to producing regions. But higher oil prices meant higher energy subsidies — 
about 33 percent more than projected. Finally, the technical aspects (discussed above and in Section 4) of 
the inter-governmental revenue transfer arrangements under the DAU meant that these transfers remained 
at their initially budgeted levels despite the difference between realized oil & gas revenues and the 
initially budgeted amounts (Table 2). 
  3Table 2: The fiscal impacts of higher oil prices and lower production in 2007 
   Projected Outcome  Change 
    Units  % GDP  Units  % GDP  % 
Indonesian crude  US$/barrel  63.00   69.69   16.20% 
Production m  barrel/day  0.950   0.899   -5.40% 
Exchange rate  Rp/US$  9,050   9,130   0.90% 
Government oil and gas 
revenues  Rp billion  181,134  4.8  168,784 4.3%  -7% 
    Tax  Rp billion  41,242 1.1  44,000 1.1%  7% 
    Non-tax  Rp billion  139,893 3.7  124,784 3.2% -11% 
Government energy subsidies   Rp billion  87,676  2.3  116,890 3.0%  33% 
DAU (26% of APBN 
projected oil and gas revenue)  Rp billion  40,236  1.1  40,236  1.0%  0% 
Oil and gas revenue sharing 
transfers to regions  Rp billion  26,382  0.7  23,394  0.6%  -11% 
Oil and gas 'balance'  Rp billion  26,840  0.7  -11,736 -0.3% -144% 
Source: Ministry of Finance.    
 
This analysis of recent oil and gas-related fiscal flows enables simulations of the likely impact of higher 
oil prices on Indonesia’s public finances. Figure 1 and Figure 2 bring together the simulated estimates of 
the impacts of movements in oil and gas prices on revenues, expenditures on energy subsidies plus sub-
national transfers, and the overall government deficit. Energy-related expenditures rise faster than 
revenues due to higher energy consumption. Even with the reduced fuel subsidies post-May 2008, the 
central government budget balance will become negative if oil prices stay substantially above US$ 100 
per barrel (figure 1). Due to the more rapid increase of expenditures, the central government budget 
deficit increases with rising oil prices – and declines with falling prices (figure 2).   
Figure 1.  The impact of oil prices on 
Indonesia’s revenues and expenditures 
Billions of US dollars 
Figure 2.  The impact of oil prices and energy 
subsidies on the central government budget 










































Source: World Bank staff estimations. 
 
This paper estimates the impact of higher international oil prices on the government’s fiscal position in 
2008 and beyond. It does this by describing the link between the government’s revenues and 
expenditures, international oil prices, and domestic subsidized product prices and inter-governmental 
transfers. Section 2 overviews the process by which extracted oil and gas is converted into government 
revenue, and simulates the effects of an increase in international oil prices. It lays out the main 
  4characteristics of the upstream oil production sector and outlines how private contractors’ production is 
shared with the government, then proposes an approach to estimating how changes in international oil 
prices affect Indonesian national revenue. Section 3 focuses on the expenditure side of the budget, 
highlighting the main characteristics of current fuel price subsidy mechanisms. It examines the degree of 
pass-through of international crude oil prices to domestic petroleum product prices, and the effects of 
hypothetical domestic price changes on overall subsidy expenditures, accounting for consumers’ response 
to those price changes. Section 4 looks at the central government’s other oil and gas expenditure items, 
namely the transfers and revenue-sharing arrangements with sub-national governments.  
 
2. OIL AND GAS REVENUE TRENDS  
Despite unexpectedly high international crude oil prices, realized Indonesian government revenues from 
oil and gas production have consistently fallen below the government’s budget projections. This 
disappointment largely stems from poor oil production. The older oilfields are generally more lucrative, 
with lower production costs and the chemical composition of the oil makes it relatively more valuable for 
international refiners. Production from these fields is now declining and, as they age, each barrel of oil 
costs more to extract. Offsetting this declining revenue stream has been higher gas production. However, 
in the current circumstances, gas production is less lucrative for the government given that many of the 
gas purchasing contracts have been agreed several years in advance at fixed prices which were 
substantially lower than they are today.  
Indonesia is a net energy exporter. It also remains a net crude oil exporter, despite the one-third decline in 
production since 2000 — although it did become a net fuel and oil importer in 2003 as production and 
domestic refining capacity stagnated at a time when consumption grew rapidly. Over the first half of 
2008, net gas exports approximately balanced net oil and oil product imports. Crude oil exports decreased 
from 85 percent of consumption in 1995 to 40 percent in 2006, mainly due to a lack of investment in 
exploration and declining production from maturing fields. At the same time, Indonesia also imports 
crude oil, as some of its refineries are not able to process domestic crudes for technical reasons. 
Meanwhile, petroleum product imports have increased significantly over the past decade, from 20 percent 
of total domestic consumption in 1995 to 46 percent in 2005. This follows limited growth in domestic 
refining capacity relative to product consumption, although the impact on government revenue of 
increasing use of overseas refineries to satisfy Indonesia’s fuel consumption is minor relative to the 
movements in crude oil production and prices. 

































Source: Statistik Ekonomi Energi Indonesia 2006 and 2007 
 
Proven oil reserves have stabilized over the past two years and now approach 13 years of 2007 production 
levels (Figure 4). Meanwhile, proven gas reserves have trended upwards since significant restatements in 
the late 1980s. Reserves have grown faster than production over the past 15 years, and would now cover 
45 years of production at 2007 levels (Figure 5). These two pictures together suggest that gas production 
is likely to drive future growth in Indonesia’s energy exports.  

































Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy; World Bank staff calc'ns
Proven reserves









The Indonesian Crude Price (ICP) is the oil price referred to in the government budget documents and 
related discussions. However, this single reference price masks the diversity of the various crude oils 
produced in Indonesia and the shift in the country’s production towards lower-grade ‘sour’ crude oils. The 
margin between the price of Indonesia’s overall crude oil exports and the international benchmark of 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has widened marginally this decade. However, prices of Malaysian Tapis 
crudes have risen significantly above WTI, while the equivalent Indonesian crudes have followed this 
trend of an increasing premium (Figure 6). These developments coincide with declining output and 
  6exports of higher-valued, sweeter crudes, such as those from North Sumatra (Figure 7). For example, 
exports of Sumatran Light Crude have declined from over 170,000 barrels per day in 2000 to less than 
39,000 in 2007.  
Figure 6.  Prices of Asian sweet crude oils are 
drawing ahead of WTI, while the average price 
of Indonesia’s oil exports lags 
Figure 7.  High-value crude oils make up less of 
Indonesia’s exports 
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Indonesia Export Crude Price
WTI Crude Price 
Malaysia Tapis Crude Price
Indonesia Crude Anoa
USD











Note: The type of crude is determined by its average price per 
barrel in 2007. High-value oils recorded an average price 
above US$90; mid-value, US$80-89; and the price of low 
value oils was below US$80. These data do not fully 
enumerate Indonesia’s oil exports. 
Source: DGMIGAS; World Bank staff calculations 
 
Indonesia’s budget is becoming less dependent on oil and gas revenues, but these revenues remain highly 
important. With record prices in 2007, these revenues accounted for 23 percent of the total. Indeed, over a 
longer horizon oil and gas revenues have increased far less quickly than other sources in real terms 
(Figure 8). In 2007, total revenues and expenditures are estimated to have increased by 11.6 and 13.2 
percent respectively, while the government projects 2008 revenues to grow by 7 percent, while 
expenditures are expected to increase by almost 11 percent (these figures are all nominal). 
Oil and gas revenues flow to the government either as taxes or non tax revenues. Non-tax oil and gas 
revenues are far greater than oil and gas tax revenues (Table 3). In the 2008 budget non-tax revenues 
contribute 16 percent of total government revenue, while tax revenues only account for 5.4 percent of 
total revenue. This difference has widened somewhat in recent years. Non-tax oil and gas revenues also 
represent the largest share in total natural resource revenues, accounting for 94 percent of the total. In 
turn, oil non-tax revenues were almost three times as large as gas non-tax revenues in 2007, although the 
difference is shrinking fast — non-tax oil revenues were almost four times as large as gas revenues as 
recently as 2006. 
 
  7Figure 8.  Stable oil and gas revenue while government non-oil and gas 







1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Total central gov't revenues
Non-oil and gas central gas revenues
Oil and gas central gov't revenues
 
Note: Deflated by the implicit GDP deflator. Projected 2008 deflator growth of 12 percent. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, various APBN data and reports, World Bank staff calculations. 
 
 
Table 3. Oil and gas revenues relative to domestic revenues 
Rupiah trillion 
% 2003 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008* %
I. Domestic Revenue 100% 340.9 100% 636.2 100% 706.1 100% 892.0 100%
   1. Tax revenues 56% 242.0 71% 409.2 64% 491.0 70% 609.2 68%
       Income tax 28% 115.0 34% 208.8 33% 238.4 34% 305.0 34%
          - Non-Oil and Gas 19% 96.1 28% 165.6 26% 194.4 28% 251.4 28%
          - Oil and Gas 9% 19.0 6% 43.2 7% 44.0 6% 53.6 6%
   2. Non Tax receipts 44% 98.9 29% 227.0 36% 215.1 30% 282.8 32%
       Natural Resources 37% 67.5 20% 167.5 26% 132.9 19% 192.8 22%
          - Oil and Gas 32% 61.5 18% 158.1 25% 124.8 18% 182.9 21%
             i. Oil 25% 43.0 13% 125.1 20% 93.6 13% 149.1 17%
             ii. Gas 8% 18.5 5% 32.9 5% 31.2 4% 33.8 4%  
Note: *2008 revised budget (APBN-P) 




Non-tax oil and gas revenues: distributing production between the producer and the state 
 
The vast majority of Indonesia’s oil and gas output has been extracted under contracts with private 
investors. The state-owned oil company, Pertamina, produced only 5 percent of total output independently 
in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available. Private contractors share their revenues with 
the government through revenue-sharing agreements. These are based on Net Operating Income (NOI), or 
“profit oil”, which is the amount of oil and gas production in excess of the amount needed to cover the 
costs of production (“cost oil”), not including any production-related government taxes and charges. Such 
taxes and charges include the central government’s corporate income tax, interest dividend tax, royalties, 
and Pertamina’s retention fee. They also include local taxes (land and building taxes), since there are a 
  8separate set of revenue-sharing agreements between the central and sub-national governments (discussed 
in Section 4 below).  
The government’s revenue from an oil or gas operation depends on the type of contract agreement 
between the national government and the contractors.  There are three types of contract:   
1) Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) are the dominant types (Figure 9). The government is represented 
by BP Migas and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Under this type of contract government 
revenues take the form of cash rather than physical output, and this is paid to the Ministry of Finance.  
Operating costs are deducted from production through ‘contractor cost oil’ formula defined in the PSC.  
 
2) Contracts between the private contractor and Pertamina, generally taking the form of Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR). The equity share received by the government, represented by Pertamina, is in the form 
of physical production, with the government receiving the revenues indirectly, as a tax on the net profits 
of Pertamina. 
 
3) Technical Assistance Contracts (TAC). These are a type of PSCs that are usually limited to 
exploitation, unless the contract involves a special area in which the government has encouraged 
exploration. BP Migas is phasing these contracts out, with Oil and Gas Law No. 22/2001 mandating that 
existing TACs not be extended. 
These three contract types are not the exclusive forms of rights for exploration and exploitation, as parties 
are also able to enter into original agreements (USAID, 2006). There are two types of such agreements: 
Joint Operation Agreements (JOAs) and Joint Operation Bodies (JOBs). JOAs regulate the relations of 
the participating interest-holders, defining their rights and obligations and describing the procedures that 
the contractors must follow. BP Migas supervises the JOAs. JOB agreements create a non-legal entity that 
manages the operations on behalf of the participating interest-holders. JOB agreements are typically part 
of a JOA.  
Among all these types of contract, PSCs are by far the most 
important, accounting for 89 percent of production, while 6 
percent of production is distributed among TAC, EOR, JOB 
and JOA contract types (Figure 9). 
 
Estimating the revenue flows 
 
Extracted oil or gas cascades through a series of mechanisms 
that apportion income and costs to producers and the 
government. The exact nature and quantity of these 
mechanisms varies by contract and is also dependant on the 
original date of a field. The most important of these 
mechanisms and their relative magnitude in enabling the 
impact of oil price movements on government revenues to be 
simulated are listed below. The following describes these 
mechanisms qualitatively. Figure 10 illustrates the 
mechanisms, while Annex 1 provides them mathematically. 
Figure 9.  Production by type of 













Source: World Bank calculations from Migas-
Production data reported in USAID (2006)
  The First Tranche Petroleum (commonly referred to as ‘FTP’), is normally 20 percent of the gross 
revenue. The FTP is divided between the government and contractor.  
  9  The government typically receives 73.2 percent of the FTP, plus the ‘equity to be split’ between the 
government and the contractor.  
  The equity to be split is the site’s gross revenue, less the FTP, the cost of production and additional 
investment costs incurred by the contractor. Estimating production costs requires making assumptions 
about extraction, refining and other costs. 
  The contractor’s gross share is the remainder of the FTP (about 26.8 percent) plus an equity share in 
the field’s production that accrues to the contractor. The exploitation contract defines these values. 
  The net contractual share is the gross contractual share less the contractor’s taxes and other 
obligations to the government. 
  An important component of the contractor’s tax obligations is its domestic market obligation 
(‘DMO’) net of the ‘domestic market obligation fee’ it is paid by the government. These values are 
defined on the basis of when the contract was entered (Appendix 1 details this). In a typical contract, 
the DMO is 25 percent of the contractor’s share of the gross revenue. 
  Finally, the government applies a tax rate to the taxable share of production. This tax rate varies under 
the relevant law by when the contract was entered, with lower rates applied to more recent contracts.  
Figure 10 illustrates how production revenue is distributed in a typical production contract. Putting 
together all these components, we can simulate the revenue effects of a change in world oil prices, and 
















































* Note: Contractor tax consists of income tax (30%) and dividend tax (20%). Total tax as a percent of the equity to be split is 
calculated as:  income tax (0.3*0.3=0.09) + [dividend tax rate (=0.2)* (0.3-0.0=0.21)] = 0.13 percent. Or equivalently, income tax 
(30%) + [dividend tax (=0.2)* (100 – 0.3)} = 44 percent of the contractor share is paid to the government.   
 
   Lifting   
Volume MMBL
Price     GROSS REVENUE (GR)       US$ ICP/BBL   
Volume x Price 
First Tranche Petroleum (FTP) 
20% x Gross Revenue 
Cost Recoverable (CR) = 
ment credit (IC) cost + invest  
Equity to be Split (ETB) 
GR – FTP – CR 
Indonesia Share (IS) 
(73.21% x ETB) + 
(73.21 x FTP) 
Contractor Share (CS)    
(26.79% x ETB) + 
(26.79% x FTP) 
D  mestic Market  o
O  bligation (DMO) 
25% x 26.79% x GR 
Government Tax 
44% x (CS  -  DMO+DMO fee)  
Total Indonesia Share 
IS + DMO –   DMO fee + 
gov’t tax    
DMO Fee 
{(New oil /total lifting) x 
DMO} + {(oil<1989/total 
lifting x DMO/price x 0.2} + 
{oil=1989/total lifting x DMO 
x 0.1} 
Net contractor share    
CS-DMO+DMO fee – IC –    
gov’t tax 
Total Contractor Share    
Net contactor share + CR    
26.79% x FTP          73.21% x FTP
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3.  OIL AND GAS-RELATED FISCAL EXPENDITURE ON FUEL SUBSIDIES 
 
Fuel subsidy trends 
 
The central government subsidizes the price of a variety of energy products, including low-octane 
gasoline, kerosene, diesel, LPG and electricity. Subsidies in Indonesia have fluctuated widely over the 
past decade, following movements in international prices and the exchange rate, and adjustments to the 
subsidy regime (Figure 11 and Table 4). Fuel subsidies increased markedly from 1998 to 2000 following 
the sharp depreciation of the rupiah relative to the US dollar (which reached its nadir in 2001). They 
peaked in 2000, accounting for 28.6 percent of total spending. 
 


























Source: World Bank calculations 
 
Fuel subsidies decreased again in 2001, following the government’s fuel price increase in February 2000 
and in June 2001. The subsidy reduction in 2002 is the unique case in Indonesia’s recent past of 
incremental adjustment of fuel prices. Through 2002 domestic market prices moved with world prices, 
and even fell through the middle of the year as the appreciating exchange rate lowered the rupiah cost of 
fuel. In early 2003 the government attempted to close the gap between domestic and international fuel 
prices. However, this bold reform was ill-prepared and poorly communicated. On 1 January 2003, the 
government increased fuel prices, the same day it increased various utility prices. At the same time, the 
government was still re-building its reputation following the crisis of the late 1990s, and public 
confidence in its other expenditure programs remained low. The result was public protests, and the 
government rolled back most of the increase and broke the link to world prices.  
 
Fuel subsidies then increased sharply in 2004 and 2005 following increases in international oil prices 
(increase of 97 percent in 2004 relative to 2003), but then decreased again after the government increased 
the price of the subsidized products and reduced the number of products eligible for the subsidy in March 
and October 2005. Increasing international oil prices and a recovery in consumption suggest subsidies are 
likely to exceed their 2005 levels this year. 
 
  12Table 4.  Subsidy trends  
Rupiah trillion, constant 2007 prices 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Total subsidies 0.9       7.9       89.4     86.1     139.0  160.9  130.3  69.3     66.1     127.2  146.6  114.3  150.2  220.1  
Fuel subsidies -      6.7       41.4     68.9     86.3     138.0  115.1  49.5     45.3     95.8     116.1  68.3     83.8     119.1  
Non fuel subsidies -      -      44.7  12.7  52.7  22.9  15.3  19.8  20.9  31.4  30.4     46.0     66.4  101.0
ER thousand Rp to USD (yr average) 2.2       2.3       2.9       10.0     7.9       8.4       10.3     9.3       8.6       8.9       9.8       9.1       9.1       9.1      
Fuel subsidies as % total expenditure 0% 2% 9% 17% 20% 29% 20% 10% 8% 16% 19% 10% 11% 13%  
*2008 Revised Budget (APBN-P), assuming oil prices at US$95. Prices are deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Source: World Bank calculations based on Ministry of Finance publications. 
 
 
Fuel subsidy and domestic fuel price regime 
 
Prices of refined fuel products for households, small businesses, transportation, and public service are 
regulated on an ad hoc basis by the central government.
2 The fuel subsidy is defined as the difference 
between the regulated retail price and an agreed benchmark price which is an estimate of the “economic 
price”. Given that Indonesia is a net importer of fuel products, the economic price is therefore the price in 
the international market, currently set as the Mid Oil Platts Singapore price (MOPS), plus a factor to 
cover freight, taxes, and margins for corporate profit (i.e. so that the economic price allows for an agreed 
level of accounting profit). For 2008, the economic price is set as MOPS plus an adjustment factor of 9.5 
percent (Figure 12). This adjustment factor is often called the “alpha factor”. The adjustment factor is the 
same for gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. Yet given that MOPS varies for each one of these products, the 
factor is kept constant by adjusting the margin of production and margin TPD for each one of these 
products (Table 5). Annex 2 describes algebraically how the subsidy is calculated. 











































Source: World Bank calculations based on Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 2007 data. 
Economic price  
 84.67 USD/BBL 
(4,950 Rp./Lt.) 
Regulated price 




1,036.96  Rp./Lt. 
* 17 thnd. Klt. 
Total Subsidy Gasoline 
1.9 Bln.USD 
17.6 Tr. Rp. 
 
Total budgeted fuel subsidies amounted to Rp 83 trillion in 2007, equivalent to 11 percent of total 
government expenditure and 2.2 percent of GDP.  The total subsidy is determined by multiplying the 
product-specific unit subsidy by the estimated level of consumption for each product. Kerosene is the 
                                                 
2 See IMF (2007) for a detail of countries that have liberalized petroleum product prices and those that are set by  
governments on an ad hoc basis or using an automatic formula.   
  13more heavily subsidized oil derivate product, with a per unit subsidy (Rp 3,671 per liter, using 2007 
average prices) of more than two times its retail price (Rp 1,818 per liter). Thus, while kerosene 
represents only slightly more than a quarter of the total consumption, it absorbs more than half of the total 
subsidy; gasoline and diesel account for roughly one quarter of the total each (Table 6).
3 Large-scale 
household consumption surveys consistently indicate that households directly absorb a very large share of 
the kerosene subsidy, much of the gasoline subsidy and relatively little of the diesel subsidy.
4 
Table 5.  Fuel subsidies price benchmark and adjustment factor, 2007 
   
Gasoline 
Premium  Kerosene Diesel 
   US$/BBL  % 
of (1) US$/BBL  % 
of (1) US$/BBL  % of 
(1) 
(1) Production  67.95    67.95    67.95   
(2) Transportation  1.60  2.4  1.60  2.4  1.60  2.4 
(3) Distribution  0.23  0.3    0.3    0.3 
(4) Storage  1.95  2.9  1.95  2.9  1.95  2.9 
(5) = (1+2+4)  Cost of Supply  71.73    71.73    71.73   
(6) % relative to (5)  Margin of Production 6.26  9.2  14.37  9.2  10.00  9.2 
(7) % relative to (9)  Margin TPD 6.68  9.8  7.83  9.8  7.21  9.8 
(8) = (6)+(7)  Gross Corporate Margin (GCM)  12.94    22.20    17.21   
(9) = (5)+(8)  Cost of supply + GCM Margin  84.67    93.93    88.94   
(10)  MOPS    74.21    82.32    77.95   
(11) = [(9)/(10)-1]*100  Adjustment factor 
14.10 
(%  of 
MOPS:)  24.6
14.10 
(%  of 
MOPS:)  38.2
14.1 
(% of MOPS:)  30.9
Source: World Bank estimates based on Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources/Directorate General Oil and Gas 
presentation.  
 
Breaking the link between international market costs of petroleum products and their domestic retail 
prices requires a country to finance an explicit or implicit subsidy, depending on whether the gaps take 
the form of fiscal costs that appear directly in the budget, or quasi-fiscal costs that are nominally borne by 
government owned companies but still effectively burden the budget through depressed dividends or 
losses and debts accrued by state-owned or affiliated enterprises.
5 There are various means of setting 
retail product prices. A review of the international experience in management of domestic petroleum 
prices by Baig et al. (2007), reports that from a survey of 51 countries, nearly half had an ad hoc pricing 
mechanism where the government adjusted the price level irregularly, 14 percent an automatic adjusting 
mechanism that holds the margin between world and local prices constant while allowing domestic prices 
to adjust, and 37 percent enjoyed a liberalized pricing system. The study finds that fuel retail prices in 
countries that have liberalized markets are on average 20 percent higher than countries in which prices are 
subject to automatic adjustments (Figure 13). 
 
                                                 
3 See Annex 8 for a distribution consumption of all fuel products from 1999 to 2005.  
4 Poor coverage in these household surveys of the richest households, which consume the most fuel, make the exact 
results unreliable. 
5 There was a brief period during the 1980s when Indonesian retail prices were above international market prices, 
during which the fuel price regime acted as a tax on consumers. 
  14Table 6.  Fuel subsidy per fuel refined product, 2006 
  Gasoline Kerosene Diesel Total
Economic Price (Rp/liter)   4,950  5,490  5,200   
Price sales (Rp/liter)  4,500  2,000  4,300   
Value added tax (Rp.) -10%  391  182  374   
PBBKB (Rp) – 5%  196    187   
Net sale price (Rp)   3,913  1,818  3,739   
Volume (million K liter)  17  10  11  38 
as percent of total volume (%)  45  26  29  100 
Fuel Subsidy per liter  1,037  3,672  1,461   
as percent of net sale price (%)  27  202  39   
Fuel subsidy (Rp trillion)  17.6  36.3  16  70.0 
as percent of total fuel subsidy (%)  25  52  23  100 
as percent of GDP (%)  0.5  1.0  0.5  2.0 
Source: World Bank calculations from presentation by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources/Directorate General Oil and Gas.  
 
International increases in oil prices raise the cost of oil imports as well as the opportunity cost of exports. 
Fuel subsidies that maintain oil prices below international levels are thus impacted by any fluctuations in 
international oil prices. If international prices are low enough a liberalization of the fuel market could be 
executed without an immediate price shock. These international “break even” prices, however, should 
also be adjusted by taxes and the alpha factor. Thus in January 2007, the international price was only 5 
percent higher than the break even price of ‘premium’ low-octane gasoline, 150 percent higher than the 
kerosene break even price, and 22 percent higher than the automotive diesel break even price. Twelve 
months later these margins were far greater, making price liberalization far more difficult. 
Figure 13. Gasoline prices across Asia and major economies 




























Source: World Bank calculations based on various national sources and CEIC. 
 
Fuel subsidies tend to be highly regressive in a nation like Indonesia, as the box below describes. There 
are many additional reasons that make fuel subsidies a far from ideal social safety net: 
1)  Subsidies are grossly inefficient in targeting the poor and thus inefficiently achieve their claimed 
role of a social safety net (see below on incidence of the Indonesian fuel subsidy). 
 
2)  Subsidies undermine macroeconomic stability given the pro-cyclicality of international oil price 
fluctuations. Expenditures on subsidies increase when world oil prices increase, can also be 
  15periods of economic expansion, bundling fuel prices volatility to economic volatility (Gupta, 
2002). 
 
3)  Subsidies hinder competitiveness. In Indonesia, Pertamina is currently the sole company 
responsible for fulfilling Public Service Obligation (PSO) and thus the only channel for subsidies 
to flow to retail consumers. Other companies have recently been allowed to sell market-priced 
higher octane fuels and other products, but their penetration remains very small, mainly because 




4)  Subsidies distort price signals to industry and households. As a consequence, they make 
inefficient and internationally uncompetitive choices, resources are used in ways that do not 
maximize their returns, and production processes are less efficient than they would be if 
producers faced the true cost of their activities (e.g., consumers buy fewer fuel efficient cars or 
live further from their workplaces than they would if they faced the true opportunity cost of their 
fuel consumption). In turn, inefficient production technologies entail higher costs and more 
energy-intensive production and, thus, higher subsidies. Additionally, these distorted price signals 
lead to wasteful or economically excessive consumption of petroleum products with the 
associated environmental effects, and ensuing health costs. Energy-wasteful and polluting 
production choices are likely to become far more expensive when carbon emissions are priced 
globally. The costs are immediate: fuel subsidies undermine the price inducement to innovate in 
terms of alternative fuels to more efficient urban design. They are also long term: today’s 
distorted choices are creating an uncompetitive capital stock, and the costs of adjusting away 
from that stock will grow as oil prices rise.  
 
5)  Subsidies reduce fiscal space. This means the government has fewer resources to promote growth 
through investments in infrastructure or human capital. 
 
6)  Lastly, subsidies generate opportunities for corruption and smuggling. Products bought 
domestically at below-market prices can be profitably smuggled to neighboring countries, or they 
can be used for unintended purposes, such as mixing the subsidized, household fuel with other 
fuel types and using the doctored fuel for industrial purposes. This in turn may undermine 
governance institutions and the rule of law. This also represents an inefficient use of scarce 
entrepreneurial talent. 
 
                                                 
6 See World Bank (2007b) for a detailed discussion of the policy reforms of the downstream industry required for a 
liberalization of the fuel market in Indonesia.  
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Box: The fuel subsidy and Indonesia’s poor 
 
Domestic fuel prices (and, implicitly, subsidies) have direct and indirect effects on household real income. The 
direct effect of the subsidies’ is seen in the gain in disposable income due to lower prices paid by households 
for consumption of fuel products. The indirect effect is seen in the lower prices paid by households for other 
goods and services led by the lower costs for fuel-based inputs of production, for  example, the food cooked by 
street vendors using kerosene stoves. 
 
Precisely quantifying these effects is difficult. We cannot directly observe which socio-economic groups 
consume which products and at what price. The official energy statistics handbook in Indonesia reports only 
aggregate fuel consumption by sectors, while the disaggregation by refined products (e.g. premium, diesel, 
kerosene) is not available by the sector of the economy consuming the fuel.
7 This is probably because retail 
sales of refined products do not record whether the purchased product will be used for domestic or commercial 
transport purposes. A 2004 household survey found that households consume 5.2 million liters of gasoline or 
30 percent out of total retail sales (17.5 million liters); 291,000 liters of diesel, or 1 percent of the total retail 
sales (27.1 million liters); and 10.1 million liters of kerosene or 89 percent of the total retail sales (11.4 million 
liters). If the same consumption shares are assumed for 2007, then 51 percent of the total amount budgeted for 
fuel subsidies would be absorbed by households.    
 
Indonesia’s fuel subsidies are regressive. Benefit incidence results can be drawn based on the 2007 National 
Household Survey. Defining the lowest income quintile of the population as poor,
8 more than 90 percent of 
fuel subsidies benefit the non-poor. Assuming that consumers pay the same price regardless of their income, 
we can see that the pattern of fuel products consumption directly determines the distribution of the subsidy. It 
is commonly argued, for example, that the significant subsidies for kerosene are justified on grounds that 
kerosene is largely the only fuel product consumed by the lower income population. Yet, while the poor 
consume more kerosene than any other fuel, national survey data reveal that kerosene consumption increases 
with income level, with the only exception of the highest 10 percent of the income distribution, for whom 
kerosene appears to be an inferior good (Annex 9).  
 
Figure 14. Incidence of fuel subsidies, 2007 
Subsidies go mostly to the richest









Souce: Susenas 2007 and preliminary World Bank calculations
Poor                  Household consumption decile                   Rich
 
           Source: World Bank calculations from Susenas 2007 
 
 
                                                 
7 Annex 9 describes the distribution of refined fuel products by overall consumption decile, based on the 2004 
National Household Survey.  
8 About 15 percent of the population was defined as poor in 2008. 
  17Fuel subsidy expenditures and international oil prices  
 
Higher international oil prices mean a wider gap with the domestic retail price, and larger subsidies as a 
result. In turn, increasing the subsidized retail price of fuel products lowers the government’s total 
subsidy payments. Here we present some estimates of the effects of some plausible increases in 
international oil prices on government expenditure. The effects are dramatic. This analysis also answers 
the policy-makers’ question of how much retail fuel prices may have to increase to hold fuel subsidy 
spending constant given increases in oil prices . 
For 2008, the revised Indonesian government projects energy subsidies at US$ 17 billion (Rp. 
160 trillion). This projection is based on an oil price assumption of US$95 per barrel and even oil prices, 
energy subsides would be higher than capital investments and social programs combined  (see Figure 15). 
It is worth noting that the approach taken here to estimate fuel subsidies — in contrast to the 
government’s approach — accounts for a potential source of underestimation of the total cost of fuel 
subsidies insofar as it includes the cost of levying value added taxes on an artificially low price (Annex 3 
describes this potential source of underestimation). 
Figure 15. Energy subsidies dominate 2008 central 
government expenditure 








Subsidies Capital invest't Social programs  
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2008 APBN-P, assuming oil at US$95; 
social program expenditure data from 2008 APBN. 
 
Energy subsides cover more than just artificially low prices for certain fuels. Subsidies to the state-owned 
electricity generator PLN are also highly significant – they are likely to approach US$ 10 billion in 2008. 
The government also subsidies the cost of low-volume LPG cylinders (typically bought by poorer 
households) but the difference between the subsidized price and cost is relatively small and volumes are 
low. The subsidy to PLN is highly complex, given the differential supply cost across the archipelago and 
the complex array of tariffs levied depending on the type of user and their connection’s capacity. For this 
exercise we reduce that complexity to a ratio between PLN’s generating costs, the USD price of oil and 
the rupiah exchange rate: a US$1-per-barrel increase in the price of crude oil increases the required 
subsidy by Rp 790 billion in 2008. Finally, the state-owned railway company receives subsidized fuel, 
however we do not consider these given their small order of magnitude relative to the other subsidies. 
These estimates allow for international higher oil prices to affect the quantity of subsidized fuel 
consumed, hence the total cost of the fuel subsidy. Two factors are likely to drive the response of 
  18subsidized fuel consumption to the market price: high-income consumers have more incentive to switch 
from higher octane, non-subsidized fuel to lower octane, subsidized fuel; and the smuggling of subsidized 
fuel to other economies and its mixing with other fuel types. Smuggling is likely to swell where 
neighboring economies allow their fuel prices to move with international prices and the difference 
between Indonesian prices and international prices expands, creating an increasing incentive to smuggle 
Indonesian fuel products to other neighboring economies. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that when 
the gap between Indonesian and neighboring economies’ fuel prices is wide, smuggling is very 
significant, but estimates of the volume of smuggling vary widely and limited data restrict our ability to 
disentangle smuggling from other determents of fuel demand. More detailed data would enable better 
estimates, for example monthly data on fuel consumption in the provinces near neighboring economies 
and for otherwise similar provinces where fuel is more likely to only be consumed locally.  
Short of a significant drop in international crude oil prices, Indonesia’s policy-makers have two means of 
addressing expanding fuel subsidy costs: increase the retail price of the subsidized products, or reduce the 
quantity of subsidized products consumed. As measures to restrict consumers purchasing of subsidized 
products are likely to be technically demanding,
9 we explore the re-pricing option here. Increasing the 
price of one of these fuel products will lead households to reduce their consumption of that product, and 
to switch to other products. Increasing prices by another US 10 cent per liter (Rp 1,000 or 17%) from the 
current price of Rp 6,000 is estimated to reduce gasoline consumption by 3 percent but increase transport 
diesel consumption by almost 1½ percent. A 20 percent increase in the price of kerosene — relatively 
modest given its very large subsidy — would lead to about 3½ percent less kerosene being consumed. 
These elasticity estimates, and the error correction models used to estimate them, are tabled in Annex 4. 
Accounting for these estimates of demand responses, the lower panel in Table 7 reports our estimates of 
the likely spending on fuel and energy subsidies overall with various increases in domestic fuel prices 
given various world crude oil prices. 
Table 7.  Estimated central government expenditure on energy subsidies 
$60 $70 $80 $90 $100 $110 $120 $130 $140 $150 $160
US$ bil. 13.0 16.1 19.2 22.3 25.4 28.5 31.7 34.8 37.9 41.0 44.1
% GDP 2.6 3.3 3.9 4.6 5.2 5.8 6.5 7.1 7.7 8.4 9.0
Oil & gas-related outlays:
US$ bil. 9.2 12.3 16.3 20.3 24.3 28.3 32.3 36.3 40.3 44.3 48.3
% GDP 1.9 2.5 3.3 4.1 5.0 5.8 6.6 7.4 8.2 9.0 9.8
Increasing regulated kerosene, gasoline, diesel and LPG prices by:
US$ bil. 7.2 10.3 14.3 18.3 22.3 26.3 30.3 34.3 38.3 42.3 46.3
% GDP 1.5 2.1 2.9 3.7 4.6 5.4 6.2 7.0 7.8 8.6 9.4
US$ bil. 5.2 8.3 12.3 16.3 20.3 24.3 28.3 32.3 36.3 40.3 44.2
% GDP 1.1 1.7 2.5 3.3 4.1 5.0 5.8 6.6 7.4 8.2 9.0
US$ bil. 2.5 5.7 9.7 13.7 17.7 21.7 25.7 29.6 33.6 37.6 41.6
% GDP 0.5 1.2 2.0 2.8 3.6 4.4 5.2 6.0 6.9 7.7 8.5




International Crude Oil Prices (US$):
Oil & gas revenues
No change in subsdized 
product prices
15%
% GDP -0.9 -0.2 0.6 1.4 2.2 3.1 3.9 4.7 5.5 6.3 7.1 
Note: Estimates are made from a June-2008 baseline, of WTI at US$110 and after the May-08 product price increases. 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
 
 
                                                 
9 From late 2007 the Ministry of Energy proposed distributing a so-called ‘smart card’ to households, that would 
entitle the holder to purchase a limited quantify of fuel each month, requiring larger consumers (generally richer 
households) to pay the economic cost for any additional fuel. This proposal was dropped mid-2008 due to concerns 
about its technical feasibility. 
  194. INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 
 
Oil and gas production not only provides a significant amount of revenue to the central government. It 
also funds Indonesia’s far-reaching decentralization, using an array of formal revenue-sharing agreements 
with sub-national governments. Indonesia’s 434 districts and 33 provinces now spend as much as 36 
percent of the country’s total public expenditures. But vertical fiscal imbalance in terms of revenue 
raising is very high: these units raise only about 5 percent of their expenditure themselves. Sub-national 
governments instead rely on various forms of revenue sharing, including sharing of oil and gas revenues, 
as well as an equalization block grant and smaller special, earmarked grants.  
While these shared revenues appear as an expense for the central government, they flow directly to sub-
national governments and so have a little impact on Indonesia’s overall public sector fiscal position. The 
following paragraphs describe how the different procedures relating to oil and gas revenue function, how 
movements in oil prices impact on these transfers and hence central government expenditures, and how 
the formula for calculating these transfers influence the central government’s choice of budget 
assumptions. 
The main intergovernmental transfer affected by oil and gas receipts is ‘revenue sharing’. Its size relative 
to the national budget has slightly increased from 2001 to 2007 (from 6 percent to 9 percent of total 
central government expenditures). It continues to represent just above a quarter of total transfers in the 
country, as other types of transfers have kept pace with its growth (Table 8, see Annex 5 for transfers in 
Rupiah). The regions where the oil and gas is extracted receive additional shares of oil and gas revenue, 
as do the special autonomy regions of Papua and Aceh.  
Table 8.  Intergovernmental transfers  
Percentage of total national expenditures 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008* 
Total  Transfer  to  Regions  24% 31% 32% 31% 29% 34% 33% 30% 
Revenue  Sharing  6% 8% 8% 9%  10%  10% 8% 8% 
General Allocation funds (DAU)  18%  22%  20%  19%  17%  22%  22%  18% 
Special  Allocation  funds  (DAK)  0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
Special Autonomy and Adj. Funds  0%  1%  2%  2%  1%  1%  1%  1% 
*2008 Revised budget (APBN-P).   
Source: World Bank calculations base by Ministry of Finance publications. 
 
 
Sharing of tax and non-tax revenues  
 
Revenue sharing is determined by formula that was formalized into legislation in 2004 and 2005 (Article 
11, Law No. 33/2004 and GR No. 55/2005). In summary, the following proportions of government 
revenue are shared: 
  20Taxes  
20 percent of personal income tax (PPh)
10   
90 percent of land and building tax (PBB) 
80 percent of property title transfer tax (PBHTB) 
Non taxes  
15 percent of net oil revenue resources   
30 percent of net gas revenue resources 
80 percent of natural revenue resources from mining, forestry, fisheries  
 
Special autonomy regulations give Aceh and Papua additional revenues of 70 percent of oil revenues and 
natural gas revenues generated in their regions (Law No. 18/2001 and Law No. 21/2001, respectively). In 
2009, an additional 5 percent of oil and gas revenues will be transferred to regional governments, with the 
relevant legislation requiring that these be spent on primary education (Law No. 33/2004, Article 20 and 
Article 106). With increasing oil and gas prices, transfers to oil producing regions (and their neighbors) 
have more than doubled since 2003. 
Intergovernmental revenue-sharing is based on net oil and gas revenue, which is largely equivalent to 
profits after cost recovery and deduction of the PSC’s share but before tax. This is additional to the First 
Tranche of 10 percent of revenues that are directly transferred to the government prior to cost recovery. It 
is allocated to the regions where the oil revenue was generated. Thus net oil revenues are distributed 85 
percent to the central government and 15 percent to the relevant sub-national government (Law No. 
33/2004, Article 14). Net gas revenues are divided 69.5 to the central government; and 30.5 to sub-
national governments.  The regions’ oil share (15 percent) is divided, in turn, in the following way: 3 
percent to the province where the oil was produced, 6 percent to the producing district, and the remaining 
6 percent of total net revenue to other districts in the producing province (Law No. 33/2004, Article 19, 
Paragraph 2; see Annex 6 and Figure 16). The region’s gas share (30 percent) is allocated in the following 
way: 6 percent producing province, 12 percent to producing district, and 12 percent to other districts in 
the producing province. (Law No. 33/2004, Article 19, Paragraph 3. See Figure 16 and Annex 6.)  
 
                                                 
10 Income tax sharing was instituted in 2000 (Article 31 Law No. 17/2000), with pre-determined ratios of 20 percent 
of personal income tax shared with regional governments, with 8 percent going to the provincial government 
whence the revenue originated, and 12 percent to the originating district/city government). 
  21Figure 16.  Example of tax and non-tax revenue sharing for gas, in a PSC sharing of 45 percent 
government and 55 percent contractor 
 
 
    
 
 









Total Indonesia share 
69.2% 
Net contractor share 
30.8%
- (minus central and local taxes and Pertamina retention) 
PPh + PPh 26              : 24.2% 
PPN, PBB, local taxes and land and building tax : 10.4% 
Pertamina “retention”                                : 5% 
Base for sharing:  29.6%
Regional share (30%): 8.9%  Central share (70%): 20.7% 
Indonesia share 
45% 













Producing Province 6%  Producing district/city 12%  12 percent distributed among other 




   
Note: The calculation of contractor tax is the same as that for oil sharing (Figure 10). 
 
Financial Management and Budgeting  
The allocation of funds for revenue-sharing is based on the actual, realized oil and gas revenue. This 
means that it is based on actual oil profits reported from the state-owned oil company, Pertamina, plus 
any additional non-tax revenues received directly from oil producers and reflects both the actual price 
received and quantity produced. Pertamina has often delayed transferring profits to the Ministry of 
Finance. For example, profits in 2006 were only transferred in December. This has been partly explained 
by the government’s delay in transferring the cost of subsidies to Petermina. Despite these delays, there 
have not been major delays in the transfers of shared revenue to regional governments as the central 
government makes the transfers quarterly, based on estimated profits for the current quarter and with an 
adjustment for the differences between projected and actual profits in the previous quarter’s transfer.
11  
Over the period 2002-06, the budgeted oil price was constantly underestimated (and subsequently revised 
upwards) while the budgeted quantity was overestimated (and subsequently revised downwards).  For 
example, oil prices were underestimated by more than 100 percent in 2005 (Table 9). While no regulatory 
changes have been made regarding the oil price budgeting process, the 2006 budget was based on more 
realistic oil price assumptions. In principle this should decrease the differences over the four stages of the 
budget from its original to the latest revision.
12 On the other hand, the quantity of crude oil production 
was constantly overestimated, by an average of 9 percent from 2000 to 2006.  
                                                 
11 There were however, some delays in the transfer of revenues to regions. These delays follow the late reporting of 
profit estimates by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.  
12 That is: the RAPBN: draft presented to parliament in August previous year; APBN: approved October previous 
year; RAPBN-P draft revision presented to parliament in the first part of the budget year; APBN-P revised budget 
approved in the current year. 
  22Table 9.  Prices and production of oil in Indonesia (budgeted and actual)  






Oil price- budget (US$)  18.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 24.00 57.00 63.00 95.00 31.25 
Oil price- actual (US$)  29.10 24.60 23.50 28.75 37.17 51.80 64.00 69.69  --  41.08 
 percent difference  62% 12%  7%  31% 69%  116%  12% 11%  -- 31% 
Oil produc’n- budget 
(MBPD)  1.46 1.46 1.32 1.27 1.15 1.13 1.05 1.00  0.927  1.23 
Oil produc’n- actual 
(MBPD)  1.41 1.34 1.26 1.09 1.04 0.99 0.96 0.90  --  1.12 
 percent  difference  -3% -8% -5%  -14%  -10%  -12%  -9%  -10%  -- -8.7% 
Oil & gas-related DAU:         
Rp tr.  9.6  18.1 16.4 17.3 12.5 13.3 40.7 40.2 34.3   
Actual transfer, 
based on 
projected rev.  % tot. 
rev
† 
6.3% 6.9% 5.4% 5.1% 3.6% 3.6% 6.5% 5.6% 4.5% 5.3% 
Rp tr.  22.2 27.1 20.1 20.9 28.2 36.1 52.3 43.9 61.5    Hypothetical 
transfer, based on 





9.0% 6.7% 6.1% 7.0% 7.3% 8.2% 6.2% 6.9% 7.6% 
*2008 Revised budget (APBN-P). 
† Percent of total government revenue projected in the APBN. 
‡ Percent of realized total 
government revenue. 
Source: World Bank calculations based on Ministry of Finance publications. 
 
The most important element of Indonesia’s transfer system – and the single largest item in the central 
government budget – is the general allocation grant Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) which represents 26 
percent of the national budget.  The DAU is based on the forward estimates of total government revenue 
made as the budget is approved – and not on realized outcomes. The central government retains any 
revenue above its projected revenue pool but must finance and transfer any over-estimate of DAU 
resources if oil and gas revenues turn out to be lower than projections (e.g., if oil prices and/or production 
are less than expected). Historically, this created an incentive for the central government to underestimate 
its likely revenue by projecting an unrealistically low oil price. Until 2006, this underestimation of the oil 
price assumption resulted in significant discrepancies between budgeted revenues and actual realizations, 
and between the amount of funds transferred under the DAU and the amount that would have been 
transferred based on realized receipts. (Table 9; see World Bank 2007a). 
Oil prices play an indirect role in the resource transfers to the regions and it is not only the oil producing 
regions which will continue to benefit from high oil prices. In 2006, the DAU increased by 75 percent 
after the Government increased the oil price assumption from US$ 30 to US$ 60 per barrel, which was 
part of a broader improvement in revenue mobilization. Since then, sub-national government had even 
more difficulties spending their resources and by end-2006, their financial reserves reached US$ 10 
billion First, oil tax and non-tax revenues represent 20 percent of national domestic revenues. Thus, a 
given percentage increase in the price of oil does not translate in to the same percentage increase in total 
domestic revenues net of revenue-sharing (which is used as a base for determining the pool of transfers). 
Second, only 10 percent of regional governments receive oil and gas revenue-sharing funds. Third, 
regional governments receiving oil and gas revenues have accumulated a windfall of financial resources 
in the past few years and still hold unused revenues in bank accounts. Estimates of oil-price to sub-
national revenue elasticities range across transfers from 0.19 for both the general allocation transfer DAU 
and the special autonomy and adjustment fund, to 0.37 for revenue-sharing (World Bank, 2007a).    
 
  23Fiscal equality and the geographic distribution of revenue-sharing  
Due to the revenue sharing mechanism for revenues from natural resources (Figure 16), there are large 
disparities in revenue-sharing across districts (Figure 17). These reflect the endowment of resources 
available in the geographic area.
13 Thus, the oil-rich province of East Kalimantan (Kalimantan Timur) 
receives per capita natural revenue-sharing of Rp 3.8 million, in contrast to the province Central Java 
(Jawa Tengah), which receives per capita revenue of only Rp 37,000. 
 
Figure 17.  Natural resources revenue-sharing per capita by province 
 
Source: World Bank calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Like in other countries, high oil prices increase inequalities between oil producing regions and non-
producing regions. Some resource rich regions, particularly in East Kalimantan and Riau, are benefiting 
disproportionately from high oil prices. However, in Indonesia these inequalities are less pronounced and 
currently not a major policy issue because all provinces – particularly the poorest – have received 
substantial inflows of additional transfers from the center. Almost all of Indonesia’s regions receive more 




                                                 
13 See Annex 10 for a review of nominal per capita revenue sharing across provinces and natural revenue sharing 
relative to other lines of sub-national revenue. Annex 11 provides an analysis of the equalization impact of DAU 
allocations compared to natural resource revenues. 
  24ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1. Estimating revenue flows 
 
Estimating with any accuracy how a given oil price and production level flows into government revenues 
requires detailed information of each of the production contracts. But this is not available for any of the 
contract types described in Section 2. Rather, publicly available information throws enough light to 
describe in approximate terms the linkages between total production income and the government’s 
receipts.  We can mathematically describe the distribution of revenues between government and private 
contractors as follows. The Indonesian Government’s share can be written as: 
 
Cs E F Gs − + =  
 
where Gs is the government share, F is First Tranche Portion  (equal to 20 percent of Gross Revenue), E 
is Equity to be split, and Cs is the Contractual Share of the contractor.  In turn, each of this formula’s 
subcomponents can be defined as follows.   
 
Ic C F R E − − − =  
 
where R is gross revenue,  C  is the cost of production (requiring assumptions about extraction, refining 
and other costs).  and Ic denotes additional investment cost incurred by the contractor.  
 
The gross contractual share (Cs) can be broadly defined as:  
 
Es Fs Cs + =  
 
where  Fs is the FTP share (portion of the FTP that is excluded from the government share), and  Es is the 
equity share (share of the equity that accrues to the contractor). The shares of FTP and E that go to the 
contractor is specific to each exploitation contract - call the shares Ff and Ef factor shares.  Contractors 
must pay taxes and other obligations to the government and so the net contractual share (Ns) can be 
defined as follows:  
 
Cr Nc Ns + =  
 
where  Cr is cost recoverable  , and Nc is the net contractual obligation defined as:   Ic C Cr + =
 
T Ic Ts Nc − − =  
 
where  Ts is taxable share,  
 
Ic Df D Cs Ts + + − =  
 
where the new variables are D domestic market obligation (DMO) and Df, the domestic market obligation 
fee. The domestic market obligation and fees are determined based on the date the contract became 
effective, on the basis of : 
 
R Ff D * * 25 . 0 =   if  , else D= Es ; and  Es R Ff > ) * * 25 . 0 (
 
) 1 . 0 * * ( ) 2 . 0 * * ( ) * (
3 2 1 D S D S D S Df + + =  
 
TotalOil O S old /
1 =  ,  ,  .  TotalOil O S / 89
2 = TotalOil O S new /
3 =
 
Finally the tax due to government (T) equals: 
 




  25Annex 2. A mathematical presentation of petroleum subsidies 
 
Mathematically the subsidy for petroleum product i in time (year) t can be defined as the difference 
between the estimated economic price (Ei,t) and the net of tax retail price (Pi,t)    prescribed by the 
government (equation 1), 
 
t i t i t i P E S , , , − =     (1) 
 
where the economic price is defined as the price that would prevail in the market in the absence of any 
government regulation. This is defined as the border wholesale price of refined product (Wi,t), plus costs 
of transportation, storage, and distribution (Fi,t), consumption taxes (Ti,t) (VAT and fuel tax), and a margin 
of profit to retail stations (M i,t), (equation 2).  
 
t i t i t i t i t i M T F W E , , , , , + + + =  (2) 
 
The difference between the border wholesale price (Wi,t) and the domestic cost of production (Ci,t) 
determines the margin of production (Mpi,t) (equation 3). The difference between the economic price and 
the wholesale border price is commonly called ‘factor alpha’ in Indonesian national debate as and usually 
expressed as a percentage of the latter (equation 4): 
 
 
t i t i t i C W Mp , , , − =         (3) 
    ( )
t i





= α       (4) 
 
The adjustment factor is the same for gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. Yet given that MOPS varies for each 
one of these products, the factor is kept constant by adjusting the margin of production and margin TPD 
for each one of these products (Table 5). The difference between the cost of production and the estimated 
economic price, accounts for 24.6 percent of the production cost of gasoline, while the analogous figures 
for kerosene and diesel are 38.2 percent and 30.9 percent, respectively. 
 
  26Annex 3. An explanation for the under-estimation of fuel subsidies 
 
Let  P
eb= Poil + α, economic price of oil product at border  
 
α = all refining, distribution and transportation margins plus economic profit 
P
e = economic price after tax and let π be (1 + VAT + PBBM) ; VAT and PBBM are 10 percent and 
5 percent respectively. P




eb x π 




d) x Q 












d)/π) x Q. 
 
Therefore the amount of the fuel subsidy will be underestimated by:  
S
e- S
g = ((π – 1)/π x (P
e-P
d)) x Q 
 
Since π = 1.15 for gasoline and diesel oil and π = 1.1 for kerosene: 
S
e - S
g =  (0.15/1.15) x (P
e-P
d) x Q for gasoline and diesel oil and 
= (0.1/1.1) x (P
e-P
d) x Q for kerosene. 
  27Annex 4. Elasticity estimates of demand of subsidized fuel products 
 
Very few attempts have been made for developing economies to estimate the responsiveness of demand 
for subsidized fuel products to those products own price, prices of substitute products, and to national 
income (Epsey 1998 surveys the literature). The elasticities underlying the discussion in Section 3 above 
are estimated in both one- and two-stage error correction frameworks. The table below reports the model 
specifications and coefficients. The cumulative impacts are based on impulse-response exercises using the 
estimated coefficients. These coefficient estimates were corroborated through simple dynamic models. 
The coefficients were estimated using monthly aggregate data of Indonesian consumption and prices of 
various fuel products. The income variable is interpolated aggregate GDP (measurement issues precluded 
use of gross national income, while monthly income indicators are not available for Indonesia). 
 
The models estimated are based on the following form, comprised of a long-run component and a short-
run component: 
 
) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
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Estimates of subsidized fuel product elasticities 
Dependent variable: change in 






















Cumulative income elasticity: 1.90 1.35 SR: 0.8 ; LR: 0
-0.86 -0.47 -0.82
0.14 0.10 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.31 0.45
Durban-Watson 2.07 2.00 2.04
Note: Standard errors reported in italics below coefficients. Intercepts not reported.
Source: World Bank staff calculations, using data collected through CEIC.
Lagged change in (log) product 
consumption:
Income (log):
Change in (log) income:
Speed of adjustment:
Change in substitute (log) product 
price:
Price of a substitute product (log):




The levels of the quantify of subsidized fuel consumed, and the price of subsidized fuel, the market price 
of fuel and income levels are all I(1), and the respective cointegrating relationships pass the usual tests 
(Johansen test for cointegration; detailed results are available from the authors on request).  
  28Annex 5. Transfers in constant 2007 prices, trillion Rupiah  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Total Transfer to Regions  129   136   156  181   180  183 241  253  261
Revenue  Sharing  34 40  47 51 60 69 63 69
General Allocation funds (DAU)  102 110  116 114 108 155  165  160
Special allocation funds (DAK)  1 1 4 6 6 12  16  19
Special Autonomy and Adj. Funds  0 6 14 10 9 4  9  12
*Revised budget (APBN-P).  
Note: deflated with implicit GDP deflator. Projected 2008 GDP deflator growth of 12 percent. 








Government revenues from oil and gas are collected from: Pertamina own operations, contractual 
production sharing, and other sharing contracts.  
 
Summary of PP 41/1982 on responsibility and procedure of payment to government from Own Pertamina 
Operation and Contract Production Sharing 
 
-  Pertamina operations 
Pertamina is mandated to pay every month a tax of 60 percent of Net Operating Income from all own 
operations to the State Treasury Account in Bank Indonesia. 
 
-  Production Sharing Contract 
o  Contractors are obligated to pay corporate income tax and interest, dividend, and royalty tax 
of 56%
14, at the latest date of the 15
th of the following month, to the MoF’s foreign currency 
account in Bank Indonesia.  
o  Contractors are obligated to deliver monthly and annual reports on the calculation of 
corporate income tax and interest, dividend, and royalty tax along with payment realization to 
MoF. 
o  Pertamina is obligated to pay directly all revenue from crude oil exports that belongs to the 
government under PSC to the MoF’s foreign currency account in Bank Indonesia after it 
receives exports payments. 
o  Pertamina is obligated to make a payment of crude oil that belongs to the government, which 
is used for domestic market supply, to the State Treasury Account in Bank Indonesia at the 
latest, one month after acquiring the oil.  
o  Pertamina is obligated to deliver monthly and annual reports on the calculation and payment 
realizations against government shares.  
 
-  Pertamina retention (fee) under PSC scheme 
o  Pertamina retention (fee) is 5 percent of Net Operating Income of the related PSC.  
o  The retention is subject to 60 percent tax and has to be paid to the State Treasury Account 
and MoF’s foreign currency account in Bank Indonesia every month, at the latest date of 15
th 
in the following month. 
o  Pertamina is obligated to deliver monthly and annual report on the calculation and realization 
of tax payment from the retention.  
 
-  Bonus under PSC scheme 
o  Bonus is defined as revenue from signing bonus, data compensation bonus, production bonus, 
and other bonus received by Pertamina from PSC arrangement.  
o  Bonus is subject to 60 percent tax and has to be paid to the MoF’s foreign currency account 
in Bank Indonesia. 
 
-  The calculation and payment of retention and bonus is conducted alone and separated from the 
calculation and payment of own Pertamina operation from Net Operating Income.  
 
                                                 
14 Tax rate can change and is subject to tax regulation. As of 2001 the tax rate is 44 percent.  
  30Summary of PP 18/1978 on calculation and utilization of profit and procedure of managing and utilizing 
Pertamina public reserve and PP 73/2001 on the revision of calculation and utilization of profit and 
procedure of managing and utilizing Pertamina public reserve.  
 
-  Pertamina profit is equal to net revenues from company operations minus payments to the state 
account and including retention (fee) received by Pertamina.  
-  Pertamina profit: 
o  50 percent is paid to the state account as part of government profit. 
o  The remaining is used for: general reserve, targeted reserved, production services and 




  31Annex 7. Sharing of Revenue between Pertamina and Government of Indonesia 
 
60% Non Tax Oil and Gas 
Government (PP 41/1982) 
50% is paid to the state account as part 
of government profit (PP 18/1978) 
20% Government (as 
Dividend) 
80% Government   20% Pertamina  
Pertamina Net Revenue 


























1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Auto Diesel Gasoline (Premium) Kerosene
Ind.Diesel Fuel Oil Avgas
avtur  
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 Kalimantan Timur            1,588            9,121         10,709                  3            3,245            3,810  
 Riau            1,112            7,227           8,339                  5            1,567            1,808  
 Irian Jaya Barat               661               131              793                  1               204            1,233  
 Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam               648            3,684   4,332                   4               912            1,073  
 Papua                613               775           1,388                  2               413               740  
 Riau Kepulauan               411               526              937                  1               413               735  
 DKI Jakarta            4,788               498           5,287                  9                 56               597  
 Sumatera Selatan               960            1,735           2,695                  7               257               399  
 Maluku Utara               210                 88              298                  1                 99               337  
 Jambi               493               264              757                  3                 99               285  
 Kalimantan Tengah               395               114              509                  2                 60               267  
 Kalimantan Selatan               468               345              813                  3               106               251  
 Bangka Belitung               116               141              257                  1               133               242  
 Maluku               236                 15              251                  1                 12               199  
 Sulawesi Barat                 93                   8              100                  1                   8               101  
 Lampung               307               404              712                  7                 56                 99  
 Sulawesi Tenggara               177                 17              194                  2                   9                 99  
 Sulawesi Selatan               648                 81              728                  7                 11                 97  
 Sulawesi Tengah               210                 11              221                  2                   5                 97  
 Gorontalo                 81                   2                84                  1                   3                 92  
 NTB               198               173              371                  4                 42                 90  
 Bengkulu               132                   7              139                  2                   4                 87  
 Banten                791                   3              794                  9                   0                 85  
 Sulawesi Utara               175                   7              182                  2                   3                 84  
 Kalimantan Barat               322                 20              342                  4                   5                 84  
 Bali               283                   3              286                  3                   1                 83  
 Sumatera Utara               989                 19           1,008                12                   2                 82  
 Sumatera Barat               314                 22              336                  5                   5                 73  
 Jawa Barat            2,262               403           2,664                39                 10                 68  
 NTT               274                   6              280                  4                   1                 66  
 Jawa Timur            2,008                 49           2,058                37                   1                 56  
 DI Yogyakarta               176                   2              178                  3                   1                 54  











  33Annex 11.  Sub-national revenues and equalization 
Indonesia’s transfer system is designed to reduce disparities in the country. The DAU, which finances 
almost two third of sub-national spending, has been the predominant tool in Indonesia’s fiscal 
decentralization policy (World Bank 2007a). However, with the increase in the price of oil, disparities 
widen as regions with a high share of natural resources are benefitting disproportionately. At the same 
time, the DAU has increased significantly over the past years providing much needed resources to poor 
districts. The horizontal doted line in the below figure marks the highest quintile with respect to per capita 
revenues from revenue sharing (substantially from oil and gas) while the vertical dotted line marks the 
national average per capita DAU allocation. All the dots above the horizontal line represent the richest 
districts, which should have enough fiscal resources to fund their expenditure responsibilities without the 
DAU. Some of these districts were receiving per capita DAU allocations above the national mean (dots 
above and to the right of the dotted lines in  the figure) but this practice has ended with the phasing out of 
the “hold-harmless” policy in 2008. 
 












































Source: World Bank calculations based on Ministry of Finance data. DAU data is for 2007, Natural Resource 
Revenues represent 2006 data. 
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